

Discussants comments for -
Gender and the Dynamics of Economics Seminars

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
Discussant: Karen Mumford (University of York).

Gender and Career Progression. BoE/Fed/ECB Conference
ECB, Frankfurt. October 21, 2019.


In Economics.

**Figure 1. Distribution of Questions Asked
By Gender of the Presenter**

A. Male Distribution



B. Female Distribution



In Astronomy.




Figure 2. Number of questions asked per talk as a function of the *speaker's* gender.

In Engineering.




Figure 1. Total Number of Questions by Gender.




Figure 2. Number of Follow-ups by Gender.

(Blair-Loy et al., 2017)


In Engineering.

“Under the condition of at least one question being asked during the talk, women receive six more questions than men do, on average. Further, a higher proportion of women’s talk time is spent on audience members’ speech. This means that, generally, women have less time to present their prepared talk and slides.

The larger number of questions women receive on average is mostly driven by the larger number of follow-up questions. These are questions piled on to previous questions and thus may indicate a challenge to the presenter’s competence—not only in their prepared talk but also in their response to questions. ... **Even short-listed women with impressive CVs may still be assumed to be less competent, are challenged, sometimes excessively, and therefore have less time to present a coherent and compelling talk”** (Blair-Loy et al., 2017; 15).


In Economics. Speaker confidence.

A. Pooled Sample of Seminars (N=467)



In Economics. Fairness of Questions

B. Job Market Talks Only (N=176)




Whose asking?

In Economics

“Although female presenters attract larger audiences, the gender disparity in the number of questions asked appears to be driven by male faculty asking more questions, even when we control for attendance.” (Dupas et al., 2019; 23).

In Biology.



(Hinsley et al., 2017)

Fig 2. Estimated ratio of questions from male and female scientists. The estimated ratio of male:female question rate estimated from the overall model and the two models with only those people judged to be under 50 years old. The grey lines indicate the point at which male audience members ask the same number of questions as female audience members (solid grey line) and twice as many questions (dashed grey line). The "<50 model observed proportion" is the model with the offset using the first assumption—that proportion of the younger audience that is male is the same as the observed proportion of the entire audience. This is likely to be an overestimate of the proportion of men in the younger age group, and the estimated ratio shown here will likely be negatively biased as a result. The "<50 model adjusted proportion" is the model with the offset using the second assumptions and adjusting the estimated proportion men and women in the younger audience to account for the fact that more senior researchers are male.

In Astronomy.




Figure 5. Gender ratio of questioners as a function of speaker gender for the sessions our survey gathered at least 1 talk from. The bars are labeled with chair- and question-gender pairs (e.g FC FQ = Female Chair + Female Questions, and so on.)

(Davenport et al., 2014)

In Biology/Zoology.



(Carter et al., 2018)

Fig 2. Mean importance assigned by women and men to (1) each reason why they *themselves* have not asked a question in a seminar when they wanted to, and to (2) each reason men and women believe *women* do not ask questions when they want to. Shown are the mean values for women (green) and men (orange) rating how important each factor is in restricting why they themselves did not ask questions when they wanted to (circles). For the respondents who reported a belief that women ask fewer questions than men, shown are the mean values for women (green) and men (orange) rating how important each factor is in restricting women from asking questions when they wanted to (triangles).

In Economics

“Women receive a greater number of suggestions and clarifying questions as well as questions that are considered **patronizing** or **hostile**. Overall, the questions asked of female presenters are **less likely to seem fair** and **more likely to seem unfair**— **particularly during job market talks** —at least according to the subjective judgements of our coders.” (Dupas et al., 2019; 23).

Some more interesting interpretations.

- **Home institution fixed effects.** Will these be capturing co-author effects. Can this be considered as well? (McDowell et al., 2006)
- **Coders.** We know students are harsher evaluating female faculty (Boring et al., 2016), why aren't the coders showing a difference in interpreting question type by gender of asker?
- **Seminar institution fixed effect.** Dominant regular attenders will be flushed out by these ... is it possible to investigate these type of participants more?

- Blair-Loy, M., Rogers, L. Glaser, D., Wong, A., Abraham, D. and Cosman, P. 2017. Gender in Engineering Departments: Are There Gender Differences in Interruptions of Academic Job Talks? *Social Sciences*, 6(29). doi:10.3390/socsci6010029
- Carter AJ, Croft A, Lukas D, Sandstrom GM. 2018. Women's visibility in academic seminars: Women ask fewer questions than men. *PLoS ONE* 13(9): e0202743. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202743>
- Davenport, J., Fouesneau, M., Grand, E., Hagen, A., Poppenhaeger, K. Watkins, L. 2014. Studying Gender in Conference Talks—Data from the 223rd Meeting of the American Astronomical Society.
- Hinsley A, Sutherland WJ, Johnston A (2017) Men ask more questions than women at a scientific conference. *PLoS ONE* 12(10): e0185534. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185534>
- McDowell, John M., Larry D. Singell Jr, and Mark Stater. 2006. "Two to Tango? Gender Differences in The Decisions to Publish and Coauthor." *Economic Inquiry* 44(1): 153
- Stark, A., Boring, K., and Ottoboni, P. 2016. "Student evaluations of teaching (mostly) do not measure teaching effectiveness." *ScienceOpen Research* 2016 (DOI: 10.14293/S2199-1006.1.SOR-EDU.AETBZC.v1).




Fig 1. The reputation model. This assumes people have two properties of interest: their *Scientific contribution*, which can be considered as the type of information that people add to their cv and their *Behaviour and appearance*. The *Scientific contribution* is partly determined by the behaviour through the degree of self-promotion, such as volunteering to give talks. We divide reputation into *Scientific reputation*, how good a scientist someone is considered to be, which is determined by a combination of the *Scientific contribution* and *Behaviour and appearance* through discrimination and stereotyping. The balance of these is likely to differ between contexts, for example assessing applicant for a job may be based largely on comparing CVs, while deciding who to invite to a workshop may be a less evidence-based process for which impressions play a greater role. There is also the *Social reputation*, for example is how enjoyable company a person is perceived to be. By *Status in the scientific community* we are thinking of formal positions, such as invitations to be an editor or positions within academic organisations. Invitations will consider both their scientific and social reputations. Status will feedback into reputation. Finally, there are positive feedback loops between reputation and *Scientific contribution*, for example through invitations to join projects or good students or postdocs being keener to join the group, as well as between reputation and behaviours, for example by being more confident.