


The First Two Years of the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs)

of the European System of Central Banks

Second Conference of the ESCB Macro-prudential Research Network, ECB, Frankfurt, 30 October 2012

Composite indicator of systemic stress ("CISS")



Basic <u>sub-measures</u> include volatilities, trends, spreads, recourse to marginal lending (weekly data)


Normalisation between 0 and 1 and <u>aggregation</u> weighted with correlations ("systemic")

Source: Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2011)

Studying systemic financial instability in an empirical macroeconomic model

- Bayesian Markov-switching vector autoregression model (Hartmann, Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow, 2011)
- Key ideas
 - Introduce a true indicator of systemic instability (CISS)
 - Allow for regime changes/"phase transitions" in parameters and error variances: important nonlinearities
- Variables: Production; inflation; 3-month money market rate; loan volume; and CISS
- Data: Euro area; monthly; 1987-2010
- Addresses at least three MaRs research questions
 - I. How can financial instability be represented in an aggregate model?
 - 2. How does widespread financial instability affect the real economy?
 - 3. What role is played by nonlinearities, amplification and feedback effects?

Impact of widespread financial instability on growth



Impulse response functions of I standard devation increase of systemic stress on industrial production (shock much smaller than September 2008)

Source: Hartmann, Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow (2011)



- General overview of MaRs and way forward
- Progress of each work stream
- > MaRs and the future of economics



General overview of MaRs and way forward

Progress of each work stream

> MaRs and the future of economics



General overview of MaRs...

The General Council established MaRs in spring 2010 to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and/or tools that would provide research support to improve macroprudential supervision in the EU

- The work of MaRs is organised around three work streams addressing specific research questions (see annex slides)
 - I. Macro-financial models linking financial stability and the performance of the economy (work stream I)
 - 2. Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators (work stream 2)
 - 3. Assessing contagion risks (work stream 3)
- ECB website: <u>http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_mars.en.html</u>

General overview of MaRs...

- Overall, MaRs has made significant progress over the last two years, both in terms of individual projects but also on projects conducted jointly by groups of central banks in the ESCB
- Comprehensive summary in the report released today
- Individual projects
 - MaRs has produced 81 papers so far (40 in WS1, 28 in WS2 and 13 in WS3), out of a work program of 126 individual research projects
 - 41 of them have been published or are accepted/forthcoming in the ECB Working Paper series with a "MaRs stamp" on the cover page
 - 9 papers have been published in academic journals, a few already in top journals (e.g. Journal of Financial Economics, Economic Journal and Economic Policy)

General overview of MaRs...

- Joint cross-country projects
 - I. "Canonical model" for assessing macroprudential regulatory policies (9 NCBs and ECB)
 - 2. Database on financial crises in EU countries (inputs from all NCBs)

First conference 5-6 October 2011: <u>http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/html/mar_net.en.html</u> (today and tomorrow second)

...and way forward

General Council decided to continue MaRs until end 2013

- In the additional time the focus of the work will be on
 - I. fully completing the joint cross-country projects
 - 2. derive further analytical tools for supporting macroprudential policies and
 - 3. more answers to MaRs research questions for which a broader basis and more robust results would be desirable
- Interaction with academia and other authorities (including third conference)
- Final report planned for spring 2014

General overview of MaRs and way forward

Progress of each work stream

> MaRs and the future of economics



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- A large part of work stream I projects focused on how widespread financial instability can be integrated into aggregate models (see session I)
- Relatively fundamental research, addressing one of the main weaknesses of contemporaneous economics laid bare by the crisis
- Different models feature different characterisations of financial instability: Nonlinearities; regime changes; representations of bank default (one bankruptcy rules); fire sales; widespread illiquidity of markets etc.
- Most papers focus on the role of unravelling of widespread imbalances and aggregate shocks
 - > Asset side: Banks' exposure to bubbles
 - > Liabilities side: Wholesale financing, build-up of aggregate liquidity

- Theoretical and empirical research illustrates the transmission of financial instability to the real economy
 - Constraints on credit supply, credit demand
 - > Breakdown of risk sharing disturbing households' consumption plans
- Asset price shocks contribute to business cycle fluctuations
- Recessions are significantly more severe if bank credit plays an important role in a crisis
- Some approaches from this relatively fundamental research will be developed further to derive analytical tools for supporting macroprudential policies

- More traditional macroeconomic models can still be useful, for example for the understanding the sources of the leverage cycle (see session 6 and first MaRs conference)
- Firm and bank leverage reinforce each other (moral hazard between banks and depositors with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks)
- > Shadow banking associated with securitisation amplifies the leverage cycle
- Boom-bust in housing markets: Optimism about future house valuations increases household leverage, demand for houses and real estate prices (boom); if expectations are disappointed there is overborrowing and deleveraging (bust)

- A very important area of progress relates to models helping to assess the effectiveness of regulatory policy instruments (see session 3)
- Relies critically on the advances in integrating widespread financial instability in aggregate models (see before): Benefits and costs

Different instruments considered so far:

- Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, capital requirements, leverage caps, liquidity ratios, dynamic provisioning, limits on FX lending or currency mismatches and margin requirements on repos
- Most of these instruments are found to be effective, but (i) some suggested to be finetuned and (ii) risks of unintended side effects need to be managed
- Multitude of market imperfections that contribute to systemic risk cannot be addressed with a single regulatory instrument (indiscriminate combinations of different regulations can, however, also become counterproductive)
- Critical element: Controlling fire sale risk

- Some more traditional approaches address the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy (not yet incorporating widespread financial instability; see first MaRs conference)
 - Combination of an independent macroprudential policy leaning against credit bubbles and a monetary policy focusing on inflation are the best responses to asset price or credit supply shocks in order to maintain price stability
 - Welfare comparison of an extended interest rate rule and a countercyclical LTV as means to counter boom-bust cycles in housing leads to ambiguous results (lenders and borrowers are affected in opposite ways)
- Interaction between macroprudential policies and monetary policy should be revisited with the new macroeconomic frameworks featuring financial instability, possibly leading to different insights

- One MaRs effort that stands out is the development of a "canonical model" for assessing macroprudential policies (see session 3)
- Features
 - Heterogeneous banks, households and firms which can default
 - Interbank market with a central bank
 - Business and mortgage defaults result in various frictions and externalities, like fire sales
- First full version of the model almost ready, needs to be coded and calibrated
- Envisage simulations to assess the effects of macroprudential regulatory policy instruments (capital and liquidity requirements, dividend restrictions, LTV and loan-to-income ratios, leverage ratios, taxes and levies)

- One of the areas of research of work stream 2 has been the production of various measures for the current level of systemic instability
- Composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS; see introduction)
 Part of new ESRB risk dashboard
- Distance-to-default indicators to estimate the probability of joint bank failures
- Use of these indicators
 - Identification of crises in real time
 - Historical comparisons of instability levels
 - Can they be useful as left-hand side variables in early warning models?

- A joint cross-country project has produced a database of various types of crises in EU countries (see session 2)
- Provide a homogeneous basis for assessing the performance of systemic stress and early warning indicators for banking, currency and fiscal crises
- New consistent definitions of crises including public or international support measures (both for bank and debt crises)
- Database is completed and has been made available to interested researchers: <u>http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1485-annexes.zip</u>
- Provides a basis conducting "horse races" between competing indicators

- WS2 researchers have developed new methodologies to select early warning indicators (Bayesian model averaging, self-organising maps, contagion effects (stress of neighbourhood is taken into account))
- Results suggest that attention should be paid to
 - Domestic bank credit (in various transformations) and leverage
 - Indicators of macroeconomic imbalances
 - Global aggregates (e.g. for credit gaps)
- Novel early warning approach based on decoupling of financial firms' credit risk conditions from the macroeconomic and financial variables that usually explain them

- Given the challenge in predicting crises, an important area of early warning research is also the detection of imbalances in asset prices or credit developments
- Caution should be exercised with simple statistical detrending or filtering methods to detect imbalances, in particular for dynamic economies
- New approaches to detect excessive credit based on a structural life-cycle and a regime-switching model
- Importance of market sentiment and intensity of herding behaviour for the emergence of equity bubbles (see session 2)


- Main focus on cross-border connectedness and contagion risks among European banks
- Part of the work on interlinkages in money markets
 - Further evidence of tiering in this market (some banks distribute liquidity)
 - Losses from interbank exposures are strongly bi-modal (very small/very large), which is a source of fragility

Several projects analyse contagion more directly (see session 4 and 5)

- Global empirical study of regional bank fragility and spillovers using market data
- New methodology to disentangle short-term contagion from long-term market integration
- Further progress on applying the network approach at the macro level, using financial accounts
- Network approach to counterfactual simulation of interbank contagion introduces fire sales and shows how they amplify contagion effects in a nonlinear fashion

- Counterfactual simulations of interbank contagion comparing static baseline to scenario with fire sales and leverage target (behavioural components)
- Interbank network simulated from aggregated exposures and EBA geographical distribution of 89 European banks
- "Cliff effects" and nonlinearities in the distribution of system losses through contagion
- Fire sales significantly amplify contagion effects





Special initiative on sovereign contagion research (see session 7)

- Range of methodologies: Dynamic factor models, multivariate frequency decomposition, cointegration analysis, forecasting error variance decompositions, dynamic copulas and event studies
- Different data: Sovereign bond yield spreads, sovereign CDS, bank equity returns
- Most papers (but not all) find evidence of contagion since the sovereign crisis
- Two papers argue that fundamentals and risk aversion can explain sovereign yield increases and bad news about a country economy may be confounded with news about a lack of commitment by other countries

General overview of MaRs and way forward

Progress of each work stream

MaRs and the future of economics



MaRs and the future of economics

- The new aggregate frameworks incorporating widespread financial instability directly address one of the main weaknesses of contemporaneous economics
- The use of such frameworks is necessary for convincing scientific foundations for assessing macroprudential regulatory policies
- Five years into the crisis the academic economics community has made only very few significant efforts in this direction
- Central banks participating in MaRs would find it desirable to see the wider economics community, in particular academic research and teaching, to take up more decisively these directions
- Experiences of the crisis suggest that additions to economics along those lines, which amount to a new paradigm, may be needed
- This could ensure that central bank and financial regulatory policies will also benefit from sound scientific foundations in the future
- It may benefit from considering also approaches from disciplines other than economics, whilst MaRs researchers are not definitively moving away from standard economics based on rationality and equilibrium (not tackling agent-based modelling for example)

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MaRs management structure

- Chair: Philipp Hartmann (ECB)
- Network Secretary: Angela Maddaloni (ECB); to be succeeded by Fiorella de Fiore and Kalin Nikolov (both ECB)
- Work stream I
 - Coordinators: Laurent Clerc (Banque de France) and Philipp Hartmann (ECB)
 - Consultant: Professor Xavier Freixas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona); to be succeeded by Professor Javier Suarez (CEMFI, Madrid)

Work stream 2

- Coordinators: Carsten Detken (ECB) and Katerina Smidkova (Czech National Bank)
- Consultant: Professor Hans Degryse (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Work stream 3

- Coordinators: Paolo Angelini (Banca d'Italia) and Cornelia Holthausen (ECB)
- Consultant: Professor Hans Degryse (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Macro-financial models linking financial stability and the performance of the economy

- > How can financial instability be represented in an aggregate economic model?
- How does widespread financial instability affect the real economy?
- What are the main transmission channels of financial instability at the aggregate level?
- > What role is played by non-linearities, amplification and feedback effects?
- What are the cumulative effects of the two-way interaction between financial instability and the performance of the economy at large, including the build-up and unravelling of financial imbalances?
- How can the leverage cycle be described theoretically and empirically?
- How can these models help understand the causes and features of the recent financial crisis?
- How can models help identify the appropriate macroprudential policies to maintain systemic stability?

Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators

- What are the key macroprudential early warning indicators for groups of countries with relatively similar financial structures in the European Union?
- How can the different indicators be aggregated at the EU level?
- What are the best early indicators of widespread imbalances, asset price bubbles, credit booms and over-indebtedness, distinguishing particularly between credit and valuation developments that are driven by (fundamentally justified) factors in the real economy and developments that involve systemic risks?
- > What are the best indicators of current systemic stress or instability?


Assessing contagion risks

- > How large are cross-border bank contagion risks compared to domestic risks?
- How significant are the risks of spillovers between different types of intermediaries?
- Is bank contagion risk significantly enhanced when feedback effects are taken into account?
- Can one distinguish between contagion risk, as one form of systemic risk, and the unravelling of imbalances, the Minsky-Kindleberger type of systemic risk?


Impact of widespread financial instability on growth

Real time euro area GDP growth forecast errors and coincident growth releases

a) For 2008



b) For 2009



- ---- Minimum/maximum 2009 forecast
 - Annual growth rate 2009 (ex post)