Motivation Selection

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Gap Credit shock

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Measuring Price Selection in Micro Data: It's Not There

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Motivation

- Rigidity of the price level influences
 - Real effects of monetary policy
 - Amplification through 'demand' channels
- Prices change infrequently (Bils and Klenow, 2004)
- In standard price-setting models (Calvo, 1983)
 - Low frequency implies rigid price level
- In models microfounded by fixed (menu) costs of adjustment (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
 - Price level stays flexible even if a small fraction adjusts, because
 - Large price changes are selected

Selection of large price changes

- Why are large price changes selected?
- > Menu costs: optimal to concentrate on the most mispriced products
- When an aggregate shock hits
 - Adjusted prices are the most mispriced,
 - They change by a lot,
 - Raise the flexibility of the price level.



- ▶ Revisit the Golosov and Lucas (2007)-critique to price-rigidity
- By establishing new facts using microdata
 - Generate proxies for mispricing (price gap)
 - Identify aggregate shocks
 - Measure selection as the impact of the gap-shock (micro-macro) interaction on price-change probability
 - Are prices with large gaps are changed with higher probability than those with small gaps, conditional on a shock?



- ► State dependence: price-change probability and size increases with gap
- ► No selection: gap immaterial with respect to aggregate shock
- State-dependent adjustment through the gross extensive margin
- Provides guidance for model choice and policy implications
- Consistent with mildly state-dependent models (e.g. Woodford (2009) with information constraints) and sizable monetary non-neutrality

Robustness

Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Price adjustment frictions: lumpy price adjustment
- Price gap $x_{it} = p_{it} p_{it}^*$

- *p_{it}* (log) price of product *i*: adjusts occasionally
- p^{*}_{it} (log) optimal price: influenced continuously by both product-level and aggregate factors
- Dispersed distribution



Data

Robustness

Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

• Focus: shape of the adjustment hazard $(\Lambda(x_{it}))$

- Menu cost (S,s) model
 - Step function



Robustness

Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

Price changes are large in normal times (not selection)

Menu cost (S,s) model

- Price changes are the product of
- Probability of adjustment and gap density
- ► Size of adjustment: -x_{it}



Robustness

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References

Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

Selection: new adjusters after a shock

Menu cost (S,s) model

- New adjusters after a shock are large
- Calvo (1983) model
 - Flat hazard
 - No new adjusters: no selection



Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

► Selection: reduces real effects of a monetary shock (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)

Menu cost (S,s) model

- New adjusters after a shock are large
- Calvo (1983) model
 - Flat hazard
 - ▶ No new adjusters: no selection





- IRi supermarket scanner data ($\approx 15\%$ of CPI)
 - Very granular: 170 000 products
 - ▶ Wide coverage: 50 markets across the US, over 3000 stores
 - 12 years of weekly data (2001-2012)
- Suitable dataset
 - Granularity: high-quality information about close substitutes
 - Long time series: can identify aggregate fluctuations
- Baseline data Data cleaning Expenditure weights
 - Reference prices: filter out temporary discounts <a>Sales filtering
 - Time-aggregation: monthly mode



Posted, reference and sales-price indices





IRi supermarket index

- Similar business-cycle fluctuations as CPI food-at-home
- Trend inflation lower than CPI food-at-home
 - Main reason: new products
 - Higher-quality higher-price than existing products
 - CPI takes this into account we only use surviving products



Price gap: Empirics

- A relevant component of the gap is observable
 - 1. Distance from the average price of close competitors,
 - 2. Controlling for store fixed effects (regional variation, amenities)
 - 3. Stores want no mispricing; higher: low demand; lower: low markup

Competitors' reference-price gap

- Take sales-filtered reference prices p^f_{pst}
- Calculate gap

$$x_{pst} = p_{pst}^f - \bar{p}_{pt}^f - \hat{\alpha}_s,$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_s$ is the store-FE in $p_{pst}^f - \bar{p}_{pt}^f = \alpha_s$.

- ▶ We use lagged gap *x*_{pst-1}
 - Predetermined; measure of 'initial' mispricing
 - ▶ We abstract from the impact of unobserved shocks (comp. Dedola et al., 2019)

Robustness

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Competitors' price gap, density

- Density:
 - Sizable dispersion, fat tails
 - Despite sales-filtering and store-FE



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Competitors' price gap, size Increases

Size

- Almost (inverse) one-on-one btw gap and size, on average
- Relevant component of the gap



Competitors' price gap, frequency Increases vs Decreases

Credit shock

Selection

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 Adjustment hazard in the data: (comp. Gagnon and López-Salido, 2014; Luo and Villar, 2019)

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- Increases with distance from 0
- Asymmetric, positive at 0
- Close to (piecewise) linear in the relevant range (-20-20)



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Impulse response to a credit shock

- Sizable, exogenous tightening of credit conditions
- Identified with timing restrictions (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012)
 - Increase in the excess bond premium (default-free corporate spread)
 - No contemporaneous effect on activity, prices and interest rate

Motivation Selection Data Gap Credit shock Selection Robustness Discussion Non-neutrality Conclusion References
Local projections

Run a series of OLS regressions h (Jordà, 2005)

$$x_{t+h} - x_t = \alpha_h + ebp_t + \Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t + u_{t,h},$$

- ▶ x: variable of interest, e.g. (log) price level
- ebp_t: credit shock
- $\Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t$: set of controls: contemporaneous cpi, ip, 1y and 1-12m lags of cpi, ip, 1y, ebp
- Monthly aggregates, seasonally adjusted
- ▶ 95% confidence bands





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Response of the supermarket-price index

Supermarket-price level



- Gradual response, not unlike core CPI
- Peak effect not before 24 months



- ▶ With a product-level proxy and an aggregate shock: we can now assess selection.
- Do the new adjusters after a shock have large gaps?
- Approach: Selection is an interaction between
 - Aggregate shock and
 - Product-level proxy.
- Framework: Linear probability model of price adjustment
 - Does the interaction term influences adjustment probability?



Linear probability model

$$\begin{split} I_{pst,t+h}^{\pm} &= \beta_{xih}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} \hat{\mathsf{ebp}}_t + \beta_{xh}^{\pm} x_{pst-1} + \beta_{ih}^{\pm} \mathsf{ebp}_t + \\ &\qquad \gamma_h^{\pm} T_{pst-1} + \Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t + \alpha_{psh}^{\pm} + \alpha_{mh}^{\pm} + \varepsilon_{psth}^{\pm}, \end{split}$$

- $I_{pst,t+h}^{\pm}$ indicator of price increase (resp. decrease) of product p in store s between t and t+h
- ► x_{pst-1}: price gap (to control for its regular effect)
- ebp_t is the aggregate shock (to control for its average effect)
- x_{pst-1}ebp_t gap-shock interaction (selection: focus of analysis)



Linear probability model, cont.

$$\begin{split} I_{\rho st,t+h}^{\pm} &= \beta_{xih}^{\pm} x_{\rho st-1} e \hat{b} p_t + \beta_{xh}^{\pm} x_{\rho st-1} + \beta_{ih}^{\pm} e b p_t + \\ &\gamma_h^{\pm} T_{\rho st-1} + \Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t + \alpha_{\rho sh}^{\pm} + \alpha_{mh}^{\pm} + \varepsilon_{\rho sth}^{\pm}, \end{split}$$

- ► *T_{pst}* (log) age of price (to control for time dependence)
- $\Gamma_h^{\pm} \Phi(L) X_t$ aggregate controls
- $\alpha \pm_{psh}$ product-store FE (to control for unexplained cross-sectional heterogeneity)
- α_{mh}^{\pm} are calendar-month FE (to control for seasonality)
- Standard errors are clustered across categories and time

Data

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Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

	(1) Price increase $\left(I_{\textit{pst},t+24}^{+} ight)$	(2) Price decrease $\left(I_{\textit{pst},t+24}^{-}\right)$
$Gap\left(x_{pst-1} ight)$	-1.75***	1.55***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	0.01
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.00**
Product × store FE	✓	✓
Calendar-month FE	\checkmark	\checkmark
Time FE	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
within R^2	18.5%	17.3%



- State dependence: Gap raises frequency Spec.
 - ▶ Probability of price increase 26 pp. lower btw 1st and 3rd quartile (decrease 23 pp higher)
- Adjustment on the (gross) extensive margin: aggregate shock shifts the probability of price increases vs price decreases
 - Probability of price increase 1pp lower after a 1sd credit tightening (30 bps)
 - Probability of price decrease 1pp higher after a similar tightening



Implications, cont.

No selection: Specification

- No evidence of significant interaction
- Conditional on the shock, not adjusting the prices with larger gap

Time dependence

Older prices are changed with higher probability



► No FE



▶ Relax linearity restriction: 15 gap groups, regressions with group dummies

Robustness to non-linearity, alternative gap, shock, data

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References

Conceptual framework (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

- Lumpy price adjustment: identify channels of adjustment
- Caballero and Engel (2007): two channels
 - Intensive margin: only channel in time-dependent
 - Extensive margin: new channel in state dependent
- Our contribution: generalize Caballero and Engel (2007)
 - Separate extensive margin into two channels
 - Gross extensive margin: shift between price increases vs decreases
 - ► Selection: large gaps adjust with higher probability, conditional on shock

Decomposing inflation: An accounting identity • State Dependence • Selection

Selection

Credit shock

$$\pi_t = \pi_t^+ + \pi_t^- = \int_{x < 0} -x\Lambda(x)f_t(x)dx + \int_{x \ge 0} -x\Lambda(x)f_t(x)dx$$

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- π^- : inflation from positive gaps
- Density: $f_t(x)$

Motivation

Selection

Data

Gap

- Hazard: $\Lambda(x)$
- Desired change = gap: -x





Margins of adjustment, cont.

Our evidence broadly consistent with mildly state-dependent models (Dotsey et al., 1999; Woodford, 2009) with (close to) linear and flat hazard

- Gross extensive margin: aggregate shock shifts increase/decrease frequencies
- No selection: insignificant interaction



Margins of adjustment, cont. • Calvo (1983) • Ss

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Motivation

Selection

	Data	Time-	(S,s) & Convex	Linear
		dependent	hazard	hazard
Intensive margin	1	1	✓	1
Gross extensive margin	1	×	1	1
Selection	×	×	\checkmark	X

Implications for monetary non-neutrality

- Show how our moments can be used for model selection and calibration
- ► Take Woodford (2009) model off-the-shelf Details
 - ► Rational-inattention extension of Golosov and Lucas (2007) menu-cost model
 - Microfoundation of 'random menu cost' models (Dotsey et al., 1999; Alvarez et al., 2020, implies a particular functional form)
- Calibrate to match
 - Density of price gaps
 - Generalized hazard function

Assess monetary non-neutrality based on the model (closeness to Calvo, 1983)





Data supports theoretical framework



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Average impact of a monetary shock on the price level

$$\Delta p_t(i) = \alpha + \beta \nu_t + \varepsilon_t(i)$$

Implications:

heta	0	0.8	∞
	(S,s)	baseline	calvo
Frequency $(\bar{\Lambda})$	6.9	13.2	16.3
β	37.4	15.7	16.3
$eta/ar{\Lambda}$	5.41	1.19	1

> The estimated information-friction parameter implies high monetary non-neutrality


- Use granular supermarket and PPI data to measure selection
- We have found that
 - 1. State dependence: adjustment probability increases with gap
 - 2. No selection: Conditional adjustment independent of price gap
 - 3. Adjustment through the intensive and gross extensive margin
- Implications
 - Inconsistent with standard time-dependent (Calvo, 1983) or state-dependent (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) models
 - Consistent with mildly state-dependent models (e.g. tight information constraints as in Woodford, 2009)
 - Implies sizable monetary non-neutrality



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- Selection is a robust prediction of menu cost models
- Classic papers (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
- More recent iterations:
 - ► Karadi and Reiff (2019): even if idiosyncratic shocks have fat tails (Midrigan, 2011)
 - Bonomo et al. (2019): even with multiproduct firms (Alvarez and Lippi, 2014)
- Selection weakens with information frictions (Woodford, 2009; Costain and Nakov, 2011), which also microfound 'random menu cost' models (Dotsey et al., 1999; Luo and Villar, 2017; Alvarez et al., 2020)
- Us: Empirical question



- ▶ Minimal structure (vs. suff. statistic Alvarez et al., 2020)
 - Implicit hazard-function approach (Caballero and Engel, 2007)
 - Estimate density and hazard function by matching moments
 - ▶ Sizable selection (Berger and Vavra, 2018; Petrella, Santoro and Simonsen, 2019)
 - Weak selection (Luo and Villar, 2017, 2019)
 - ▶ Us: explicit hazard function (Gagnon, López-Salido and Vincent, 2012)
- Construct informative moments that reveals selection
 - ► Carvalho and Kryvtsov (2018): preset-price-relative vs. inflation
 - ▶ Dedola et al. (2019): selection bias in Danish PPI
 - Us: shock-gap interaction on frequency



IRi: data cleaning

Posted prices:

$$P_{psw} = \frac{TR_{psw}}{Q_{psw}},$$

► *TR* is the total revenue

- Q is the quantity sold for each product
- p in store s in week w
- Cleaning
 - Round to the nearest penny (8.7%)
 - Private label products: new products at relabeling
 - Drop products that are not available the whole year

IRi: sales-filtering

- Sales: high-frequency noise (Anderson et al., 2017)
- ► Modal-price filter of Kehoe and Midrigan (2014)
- Reference prices P^f_{psw} on weekly data
 - ▶ 13-week two-sided modal price
 - Iterative updating to align the change of P_{psw}^{f} with P_{psw}
 - Reference price changes less than a third of posted price changes
- Results are robust to using posted prices
- Monthly prices P_{pst}: mode of weekly prices



IRi: Expenditure weights

Fixed-weight index (as CPI). Annual weights $t \in y$

$$\omega_{psy} = \frac{TR_{psy}}{\sum_{p} \sum_{s} TR_{psy}}$$

• Posted and reference-price inflation (i = p, f)

$$\pi_{t}^{i} = \sum_{s} \sum_{p} \omega_{pst} \left(p_{pst}^{i} - p_{pst-1}^{i} \right)$$

Sales-price inflation

$$\pi_t^s = \pi_t^p - \pi_t^f$$

Seasonal adjustment using monthly dummies



- Focus: aggregate shock price-gap interaction term
- Price increases I⁺_{pst}: expected sign is positive
 - Driven by products with negative gap $(x_{pst-1} \leq 0)$
 - Credit tightening $(\hat{ebp}_t \ge 0)$: less price increases
 - Credit easing $(\hat{ebp}_t < 0)$: more price increases
- Price decreases I⁻_{pst}: expected sign is positive
 - Driven by products with positive gap $(x_{pst-1} \ge 0)$
 - Credit tightening $(\hat{ebp}_t \ge 0)$: more price decreases
 - Credit easing $(\hat{bp}_t < 0)$: less price decreases



Specification, cont.

Additional interest

- Impact of the price gap β_{xh} : expected sign: negative for I_{pst}^+ (positive for I_{pst}^-)
 - More negative gap: more price increases
 - (More positive gap: more price decreases)
- ▶ Impact of aggregate shock β_{ih} : expected sign: negative for I_{pst}^+ (positive for I_{pst}^-)
 - Credit tightening $(\hat{ebp}_t > 0)$ less increases, more decreases
 - Credit easing $(\hat{ebp}_t < 0)$ more increases, less decreases



Match hazard function with elasticity of substitution of 7



Calibration misses left tail



Alternative calibration, cont.

Higher estimated information friction parameter

heta	0	2.562	∞
	(S,s)	uniform	calvo
Frequency $(\bar{\Lambda})$	8.5	13.6	27.1
eta	42.1	18.8	27.1
$eta/ar{\Lambda}$	4.95	1.38	1

Still high monetary non-neutrality



Specification, cont.

- 2 additional specifications for robustness
- Time-fixed effects (drop the direct impact of shock)
- Separate coefficients for positive and negative gaps

Non-neutrality

References

Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

	(1) Price inc	(2) crease $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^+\right)$	(3)	(4) Price dec	(5) (6) rease $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-} ight)$
Gap (x _{pst-1})	-1.75***	-1.75***		1.55***	1.55***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} = \hat{bp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.00		0.03	0.01
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.02***		0.00**	0.01***
Pos. gap (x_{pst-1}^+)					
Neg. gap (x_{pst-1}) Pos. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^+ \hat{ebp})$					
Neg. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^{-} e\hat{b}p)$					
Product × store FE	1	1		1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	x		1	×
Time FE	×	1		×	1
Ν	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>		16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
within R^2	18.5%	16.6%		17.3%	16.4%

Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m

Credit shock

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Price	increase $(I_{pst,t+2}^+)$	24)	Price o	lecrease $\left(I_{pst,t+2}^{-}\right)$	24)
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.75***		1.55***	1.55***	
Shock (ebp _t)	-0.03***		-0.04***	0.03***		0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.00		0.01	0.01	
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.01***	0.01***
Pos. gap (x_{pst-1}^+)			-2.26***			2.29***
Neg. gap (x_{pst-1}^{-})			-1.44^{***}			1.10***
Pos. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^+ e\hat{b}p)$			0.04			-0.04
Neg. sel. (x_{pst-1}^{-} eĥp)			-0.03			0.04
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	1	×	1
Time FE	x	1	×	×	1	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
within R^2	18.5%	16.6%	18.9%	17.3%	16.4%	18.2%

Discussion

sion Non-neutrality

Conclusion

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Gap group-dummies, within product-store, 24m

- Hazard close to linear and quite symmetric
 - Heterogeneity is controlled for (item, time FEs)
 - Predicted frequency in 24 months





Average moments

Annualized inflation		Frequency		
Posted Reference		Posted	Reference	
1.84 %	1.75%	36.2%	10.8%	
Reference	e frequency	Refere	ence size	
Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease	
6.6%	4.2%	12.5%	-15.1%	

Non-neutrality

Selection: Theory (Caballero and Engel, 2007)

► Selection: reduces real effects of a monetary shock (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)

► Menu cost (S,s) model

Data

- New adjusters after a shock are large
- Calvo (1983) model
 - Flat hazard
 - ▶ No new adjusters: no selection





Micro-data: how do standard moments adjust to aggregate shocks Average moments

► Frequency:

$$\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \sum_{i} \bar{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm},$$

Size

$$\psi_{t,t+h}^{\pm} = \frac{\sum_{i} \bar{\omega}_{it,t+h} I_{it,t+h}^{\pm} (p_{it+h} - p_{it-1})}{\xi_{t,t+h}^{\pm}}$$

Decomposition

$$p_{t+h} - p_{t-1} = \pi_{t,t+h} = \xi_{t,t+h}^+ \psi_{t,t+h}^+ + \xi_{t,t+h}^- \psi_{t,t+h}^-,$$



Price changes



Average size declines

Broadly in line with both time-dependent (Calvo, 1983) and state-dependent (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) models

Less increases, more decreases



Data

References

Price setting with information frictions (Woodford, 2009)

- Starting point: a standard menu-cost model (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)
 - Monopolistic competition with differentiated goods
 - ► Idiosyncratic cost shocks $A_t(i) = A_{t-1}(i) + \varepsilon_t, \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma_A^2)$
 - Price gap $(x_t(i) = p_t(i) p^*(i))$ determines profit
 - Fixed (menu) cost of a price review κ
- Timing of price review: rational inattention
 - Costly signal f(x) about the state (cost \uparrow w/ informativeness: $\theta I = -\theta E [\log f(x)]$)
 - Result #1: optimal policy described by a hazard function (adjustment (signal) probability as a function of current gap Λ(x))
 - Result #2: Functional form of hazard function is well defined, depends on θ (θ = ∞: constant hazard, calvo; θ = 0: step function, (S,s)).



- Use density and hazard estimated using the competitors'-reset prices
 - ▶ Valid measure if stores set prices to $p_t^*(i)$, when they change it,
 - Calibrate (i) review cost (κ), (ii) standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks (σ_A), information cost (θ) to minimize expected deviation from the
 - Hazard function (weighted w/ data density), frequency of price changes, size of price changes.



Evidence for state-dependence

Decomposition

$$\pi_t^- = \int_{x \ge 0} -x \Lambda(x) f(x) dx = \bar{x}^- \bar{\Lambda}^- + \underbrace{\int_{x \ge 0} -x \left(\Lambda(x) - \bar{\Lambda}^-\right) f_t(x)}_{\text{state-dependence}},$$

- 'State-dependence': increasing hazard (Λ): higher gaps change w/ higher probability
- We brought evidence
- Inconsistent with time-dependent (constant hazard) models (Calvo, 1983)



Conditional on a permanent shock m; x ex-shock gap



Intensive margin: those that adjust, adjust by less

Gross extensive margin: more decreases, less increases

Selection: new decreases after the shock are far from their optimum

Time-dependent model (Calvo, 1983)





Discussion

References

Selection in an sS model (Golosov and Lucas, 2007)







Nonlinearity II: Probit

	(1) (2)		(3)	
	Multinon	nial probit	Ordered probit	
	Incr. $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$	Incr. $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$ Decr. $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$		
$Gap\left(x_{pst-1} ight)$	-3.15***	3.37***	-4.24***	
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.11^{***}	0.05***	-0.10^{***}	
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.05	-0.21**	0.04	
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.01*	-0.03***	0.02***	
Freq. incr. (ξ^+_{psM})	5.17***	2.91***	1.79***	
Freq. decr. (ξ^{psM})	3.02***	5.84***	-1.33***	
$Product \times store \; FE$	×	×	×	
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	
Time FE	×	×	×	
Ν	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	14.3 <i>M</i>	

Discussion

Non-neutrality

References

Heterogeneity across product categories

- Heterogeneous demand elasticities might bias our baseline
- Separate estimates across product categories: price increases

Gap

Shock

Selection

category	Effect Size with 95% CI	category	Effect Size with 95% CI	category	Effect Size with 95% Cl
	1751 188 1621		0.031.0.05.0.021	all	-0.00 [-0.09, 0.09]
ten hoor	2 00 [2 02 2 05]	hoor -		beer	0.05 [-0.09, 0.19]
bleder 💼	-2.69 [-3.03, -2.63]	bleden	0.01[-0.00, 0.03]	blades	-0.06 [-0.15, 0.04]
piades	-1.54 (-1.55, -1.55)	plades	0.00[10.01, 0.02]	carbbev	0.01 [-0.07, 0.09]
carbbev	-1.55 [-1.57, -1.52]	caliboev	-0.02[-0.03, -0.00]	coldcer	-0.01 [-0.15, 0.13]
CONCER	-1.82 [-1.86, -1.78]		0.05[-0.06, -0.02]	deod	0.04 [-0.03, 0.10]
deod	-1.06 [-1.72, -1.61]	deod		factiss	-0.02[-0.13, 0.09]
factuss	-1.72 [-1.79, -1.64]	factiss	-0.05[-0.09, -0.01]	fzdinent	-0.02[-0.17, 0.14]
tzdinent	-1.58 [-1.63, -1.53]	tzdinent -	-0.04 [-0.05, -0.02]	fznizza	-0.09[-0.22_0.04]
tzpizza	-1.51 [-1.54, -1.48]	tzpizza 🔤	-0.05 [-0.09, -0.01]	hhclean	0.041-0.05-0.121
hhclean	-2.25 [-2.30, -2.21]	hhclean -	-0.01 [+0.03, 0.01]	holdog	0.03[-0.11_0.18]
hotdog	-1.50 [-1.55, -1.46]	hotdog	0.00 [+0.03, 0.03]	loundat	
laundet	-2.08 [-2.12, -2.04]	laundet	-0.01 [-0.02, 0.01]	laundet	0.05[-0.07, 0.24]
mayo	-1.68 [-1.77, -1.59]	mayo —	-0.03 [-0.05, -0.00]	mayo	0.01[-0.15, 0.17]
mustketc	-1.77 [-1.82, -1.72]	mustketc	-0.03 [-0.04, -0.01]	mustketc	0.00 [-0.10, 0.10]
paptowl	-1.89 [-1.96, -1.82]	paptowl	-0.04 [-0.06, -0.01]	paptowi	0.02[-0.20, 0.24]
peanbutr	-2.13 [-2.26, -2.00]	peanbutr	-0.06 [-0.09, -0.03]	peanbutr	-0.00 [-0.26, 0.26]
razors -	-3.21 [-3.35, -3.08]	razors	-0.03 [-0.07, 0.01]	razors	-0.22 [-0.54, 0.10]
saltsnck	1.48 [-1.52, -1.43]	saltsnck -	-0.01 [-0.03, 0.00]	saltsnck	
shamp	-2.07 [-2.10, -2.04]	shamp	-0.00 [-0.02, 0.01]	shamp	
soup	-1.70 [-1.74, -1.66]	soup	-0.05 [-0.06, -0.03]	soup	-0.03 [-0.17, 0.11]
spagsauc	-1.85 [-1.88, -1.82]	spagsauc —	-0.03 [-0.05, -0.01]	spagsauc	-0.02 [-0.14, 0.10]
sugarsub	-2.32 [-2.37, -2.26]	sugarsub	0.00 [-0.03, 0.03]	sugarsub	-0.02 [-0.16, 0.13]
toothbr	-1.55 [-1.59, -1.51]	toothbr -	-0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]	toothbr	-0.00 [-0.07, 0.06]
toothpa	-1.84 [-1.88, -1.80]	toothpa	-0.02 [-0.04, -0.01]	toothpa	-0.01 [-0.09, 0.06]
yogurt	-2.07 [-2.11, -2.04]	yogurt	-0.03 [-0.05, -0.01]	yogurt	0.06 [-0.10, 0.21]
	-1.92 [-2.08, -1.75]		-0.02 [-0.03, -0.01]		0.00 [-0.02, 0.02]

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Heterogeneity across product categories, cont.

Separate estimates across product categories: price decreases

category	with 95% CI	calegory	Effect Size with 05% CI	rategony		Effect Size
all — <mark>19</mark> —	1.55 [1.42, 1.68]	category		curregory	1	with 50 % 61
beer	2.27 [2.22, 2.32]	all —	0.03 [0.01, 0.04]	all	-	0.01 [-0.10, 0.11
olades 📃	1.52 [1.48, 1.56]	beer -	-0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]	beer		-0.06 [-0.20, 0.08
coldcer	1.60 [1.56, 1.64]	blades -	0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]	blades	•	0.05 [-0.06, 0.15
deod 💽	1.52 [1.48, 1.55]	coldcer	0.03 [0.01, 0.05]	coldcer	-	- 0.01 [-0.13, 0.16
zdinent	1.71 [1.67, 1.76]	deod 🔤	0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]	deod	-	0.01 [-0.07, 0.10
zpizza	1.53 [1.49, 1.56]	fzdinent -	0.03 [0.02, 0.05]	fzdinent		0.00 [-0.14, 0.14
hclean	1.65 [1.61, 1.68]	fzpizza	0.03 [-0.00, 0.05]	fzpizza		- 0.02 [-0.14, 0.19
notdog	1.11 [1.08, 1.14]	hhclean -	0.01 [0.00, 0.02]	hhclean	-	-0.03 [-0.11, 0.06
aundet	1.86 [1.83, 1.89]	hotdog -	-0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]	hotdog	-	-0.02 [-0.10, 0.07
narobutr 💀	1.32 [1.25 1.38]	laundet -	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	laundet	-	-0.04 [-0.15, 0.06
navo 🖶	130[124 137]	margbutr	0.06 [0.04, 0.08]	margbutr	-	0.01 [-0.13, 0.15
nik 🚽	191[182 199]	mayo -	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	mayo	-	0.01 [-0.10, 0.11
nustketc	129 [126 132]	milk	0.05 [0.01, 0.09]	milk	•	0.09 [-0.06, 0.23
aanhutr -	1.20 [1.20, 1.02]	mustketc 🚹	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	mustketc		-0.04 [-0.11, 0.03
		peanbutr	0.05 [0.03, 0.07]	peanbutr	•	-0.03 [-0.28, 0.22
azors	2.30 [2.37, 2.03]	razors -	-0.00 [-0.02, 0.02]	razors —		-0.08 [-0.34, 0.18
ansnok M	1.14[1.10, 1.17]	saltsnck -	0.01 [0.01, 0.02]	saltsnck		-0.01 [-0.10, 0.07
namp 🔤	1.66 [1.63, 1.69]	shamp –	0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	shamp		-0.04 [-0.13, 0.06
oup 📓	1.42 [1.38, 1.46]	soup —	- 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]	soup		- 0.05 [-0.09, 0.18
pagsauc I	1./1[1.66, 1./6]	spagsauc —	- 0.02 [0.01, 0.04]	spagsauc		- 0.04 [-0.11, 0.20
ugarsub	1.80 [1.76, 1.85]	sugarsub –	0.01 [-0.01, 0.02]	sugarsub		-0.01 [-0.14, 0.13
oothbr 🔛	1.21 [1.17, 1.24]	toothbr -	0.03 [0.02, 0.05]	toothbr		0.02 [-0.04, 0.08
oothpa	1.65 [1.61, 1.68]	toothpa	0.01 [0.00, 0.02]	toothpa		0.00 [-0.10, 0.11
ogurt	2.02 [1.98, 2.06]	yogurt	0.02 [-0.00, 0.04]	yogurt		-0.04 [-0.17, 0.10
•	1.64 [1.50, 1.77]	•	0.02 [0.01, 0.02]		•	-0.00 [-0.02, 0.02

. .

Shock

▲ Back



Reset-price gap

Alternative price-gap proxy

• Reference price reset gap
$$x_{pst} = p_{pst}^f - p_{pst}^{f*}$$

• Reset-price
$$(p_{pst}^{f*})$$
 is as in Bils et al. (2012)

$$p_{pst}^{f*} = \left\{ egin{array}{cc} p_{pst}^f & ext{if } I_{pst} = 1 \ p_{pst-1}^{f*} + \pi_{ct}^{f*} & ext{otherwise,} \end{array}
ight.$$

where π_{ct}^{f*} is category-level reset-price inflation:

$$\pi_{ct}^{f*} = \sum_{p \in c} \frac{\omega_{pst} I_{pst} \left(p_{pst}^{f*} - p_{pst-1}^{f*} \right)}{\sum_{p \in c} \omega_{pst} I_{pst}}$$


Reset price gap



References

Results, reset-price gap, credit shock, h=24m

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Price i	ncreases $(I_{pst,t+1}^+)$	24)	Price decreases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{-}\right)$		24)
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-0.45***	-0.48***		0.34***	0.37***	
Shock (\hat{ebp}_t)	-0.04***		-0.04***	0.03***		0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.14	-0.13		0.12	0.14	
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***
Positive gap (x_{pst-1}^+)			-0.39***			0.33***
Negative gap (x_{pst-1}^{-})			-0.49***			0.35***
Pos. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^+ \hat{ebp}_t)$			0.11			-0.03
Neg. sel. $(x_{pst-1}^{-}\hat{ebp}_t)$			-0.27**			0.21*
Ν	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
within R ²	2.6%	0.3%	2.6%	1.3%	0.3%	1.3%

Gap (

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PPI microdata

Coverage

- ► 1981-2012 monthly data
- Representative of the US economy
- No sales filtering





Competitors' price gap





PPI: gaps

Size: clear negative relationship with the gaps

- ► Frequency:
 - Increases with competitors' gap eventually
 - Initially decreases with higher gap









References

Results, competitors' price gap, credit shock, h=24m, PPI

Credit shock

	(1) Increases $\left(I_{p}^{+}\right)$	(2) $_{st,t+24}$	(3) Decreases (1	(4) = st,t+24
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-0.23***	-0.23***	0.22***	0.22**
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.023***		0.021***	
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.035***	0.035***	0.01***	0.01**
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	×
Time FE	×	1	×	1
N	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>	9.7 <i>M</i>
Within R ²	4.4%	3.5%	4.3%	3.7%



PPI: selection

- Results are robust using longer and wider-coverage data
- ► Gap: significant unconditional impact on frequency
- Aggregate shock: shifts the probability of adjustment
- ► No selection:
 - No evidence of interaction:
 - Conditional on the shock, not adjusting prices with larger gap



Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks

- High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)
 - Intra-day financial market surprises around press statements
 - Control for information shocks using the co-movement of interest rates and stock prices (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
- Calculate relevant price-setting moments
- Estimate impulse responses using local projections (Jordà, 2005)

High-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks

- Central bank announcements generate unexpected variation in interest rates: can be used to assess monetary non-neutrality.
- Surprises
 - ▶ Measure change in interest rates in a 30-minute window around policy announcements
 - Only central bank announcements systematically impacts surprises
- FOMC press statements (8 times a year)

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High-frequency surprises







Interest rate

Preferred interest rate: 3-months federal funds futures rate

- Closely controlled by the FOMC
- Incorporates next FOMC meeting: with near-term forward guidance
- Does not affected by 'timing' surprises
- It stays active after ZLB is reached

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Controlling for central bank information shocks

- Issue: announcements can reveal information
 - not just about policy,

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- but also about the central bank's economic outlook.
- Use responses in stock markets (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020) Scatter
 - ▶ Negative co-movement in interest rates and stock prices: monetary policy shocks
 - Positive co-movement: central bank information shocks
- Poor man's sign restriction': use events when the co-movement was negative





Local projections

Run a series of OLS regressions h (Jordà, 2005)

$$x_{t+h} - x_t = \alpha_h + \beta_h \Delta i_t + \Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t + u_{t,h},$$

- x: variable of interest, e.g. (log) price level
- Δi_t : high-frequency monetary policy shock
- $\Gamma_h \Psi(L) X_t$: set of controls: various lags of cpi, ip, dely

Motivation

Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy tightening



Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy tightening







Aggregate frequency drops

Size declines

Less increases more decreases



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References

Results, competitors' price gap, MP shock, h=12m

Credit shock

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Price i	ncreases $(I_{pst,t+}^+)$.12)	Price d	ecreases $(I_{pst,t+}^{-}$	12)
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.71^{***}	-1.71^{***}		1.36***	1.36***	
Shock (Δi_t)	-0.03*		-0.03	0.01*		0.01*
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\Delta i_t)$	-0.07	-0.07		0.07	0.07	
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
Positive gap (x_{pst-1}^+)			-1.92***			1.93***
Negative gap (x_{pst-1}^{-})			-1.58^{***}			1.01***
Pos. selection $(x_{pst-1}^+\Delta i_t)$			-0.05			0.05
Neg. selection $(x_{pst-1}^{-}\Delta i_t)$			-0.08			0.08
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	×	1	1	×	1
Time FE	x	1	×	×	1	×
N	23.7 <i>M</i>	23.7M	23.7 <i>M</i>	23.7M	23.7 <i>M</i>	23.7M
Within R^2	16.4%	14.7%	16.5%	13.3%	12.7%	13.8%



MP shock: selection

- Robustly no evidence for selection
- Significant shift in adjustment probability in supermarket prices

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Robustness to dropping fixed effects

	(1) Increases ($(2) \\ I^+_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$	(3) Decreases ($\begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ I_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-0.99***	1.55***	0.90***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03**
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	-0.01^{**}	0.00**	-0.03***
$Product \times store \; FE$	1	×	1	×
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
Within R^2	18.5%	8.9%	17.3%	9.3%

Robustness to using posted prices

	(1) (2) Increases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+} ight)$ Reference Posted		(3) Decreases ((4) $I_{pst,t+24}^{-}$
			Reference	Posted
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.46***	1.55***	1.25***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.01***	0.00**	-0.01***
Product x store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>
Within R ²	18.5%	17.6%	17.3%	14.8%

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Robustness to excluding the Great Recession

	(1) (2) Increases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$ 2001-2012 2001-2007		(3) Decreases ($\begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ I_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$
			2001-2012	2001-2007
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.74***	1.55***	1.50***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	0.06	0.01	-0.06
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.01***
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	\checkmark	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
Ν	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>
Within R ²	18.5%	17.7%	17.3%	16.5%

Discussion N

Competitors' price gap, cont.

Increase frequency

Decrease frequency



Decrease size

Competitors' price gap, cont.

Increase size







Reset price gap, cont.



Decrease frequency

Reset price gap, cont.

Increase size

Decrease size



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Robustness to dropping fixed effects

	(1) Increases ($(2) \\ I^+_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$	(3) Decreases ($\begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ I_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-0.99***	1.55***	0.90***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03**
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	-0.01^{**}	0.00**	-0.03***
$Product \times store \; FE$	1	×	1	×
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>
Within R^2	18.5%	8.9%	17.3%	9.3%

Robustness to using posted prices

	(1) (2) Increases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$ Reference Posted		(3) Decreases ($(4) I_{pst,t+24}^{-})$
			Reference	Posted
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.46***	1.55***	1.25***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
Selection $(x_{pst-1}\hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.01***	0.00**	-0.01***
Product x store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	1	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
N	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	18.6 <i>M</i>
Within R ²	18.5%	17.6%	17.3%	14.8%

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Robustness to excluding the Great Recession

	(1) (2) Increases $\left(I_{pst,t+24}^{+}\right)$ 2001-2012 2001-2007		(3) Decreases ($\begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ I_{pst,t+24} \end{pmatrix}$
			2001-2012	2001-2007
$Gap(x_{pst-1})$	-1.75***	-1.74***	1.55***	1.50***
Shock (ebp_t)	-0.03***	-0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
Selection $(x_{pst-1} \hat{ebp}_t)$	-0.00	0.06	0.01	-0.06
Age (T_{pst-1})	0.02***	0.02***	0.00**	0.01***
Product × store FE	1	1	1	1
Calendar-month FE	1	1	\checkmark	1
Time FE	×	×	×	×
Ν	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>	16.1 <i>M</i>	9.9 <i>M</i>
Within R ²	18.5%	17.7%	17.3%	16.5%

Discussion N

Competitors' price gap, cont.

Increase frequency

Decrease frequency



Decrease size

Competitors' price gap, cont.

Increase size







Reset price gap, cont.



Decrease frequency

Reset price gap, cont.

Increase size

Decrease size

